This appendix provides supplementary analyses described in the main text. The STATA replication dataset and do files include code for replicating these results.
I.
Measuring river basin conflict and cooperation
To assess the robustness of our original analyses using militarized interstate disputes as the primary measure of conflict, we estimated models using four additional dependent variables to the baseline models originally reported in the paper (Table A6 ). The first is a measure of conflict events as coded by Kahlbenn and Bernauer (2012) in their dataset, International Water Conflict and Cooperation (IWCC); https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Thomas_Bernauer2/publication/256039984_International_ Water_Cooperation_and_Conflict_A_New_Event_Dataset/links/5672793708aecc73dc0c633d.pd f. Events are coded on a conflict (to -6) and cooperation (to +6) scale for all river basin country pairs (dyads) for each year from 1997 to 2007. We created a dummy variable that equals one when a river dyad experiences one or more IWCC conflict events in a given year. The second measure is also an events database for water events from 1950-2008 as coded by International Water Events Database by Wolf and colleagues at Oregon State University (http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/interwatereventdata.html). We take the water event intensity scale (BAR) which ranges from -7 to +7 and code a dummy variable that equals 1 when a river dyad experiences one or more BAR conflict events (-7 to -1) in a given year. Because we have good temporal coverage for this events data, we also create a measure for cooperation coded 1 when a river dyad experiences one of more BAR cooperative events (1-7) and 0 otherwise. Our fourth measure is designed to capture river-based cooperation in a riparian dyad using data on the onset of river treaty commitments. We use a version of the TFDD river treaty data compiled by Zawahri and Mitchell (2011) that equals one in a riparian dyad year if one or more new river treaties were signed that year and 0 otherwise. Bivariate cross-tabulations show the relationship between upstream/downstream configuration and MID onset (Table A1) , IWCC conflict onset (Table A2) , TFDD river treaty onset (Table A3) , TFDD conflict event onset (Table A4) , and TFDD cooperation event onset (Table A5) .
By adding these additional dependent variable measures, we present stronger evidence in favor of our theoretical argument. Our key hypothesis is that militarized conflicts are less likely and cooperation more likely over shared basins under the Downstream Energy scenario than in the other scenarios (Joint Energy, Upstream Energy, No Energy) . Here we highlight some of the main findings (Table A6 without controls; Table A7 with controls) using a baseline model with 3 control variables (lowest democracy score, major power dummy, logged capability ratio). (Table A9) .
In the article, we control for the number of dams and hydropower dams that upstream and downstream states possess. This information was coded directly by the authors using the ICOLD World Register of Dams dataset. As seen in Table A9 , the results for our baseline MID model are robust when we include a count measure for upstream/downstream dams or hydropower dams. Our theory works best for dyads where the upstream state has the ability to control water flow. We estimated a logit MID model conditional on whether the upstream state has one (or more) hydroelectric dams (81.5% of our dyads). As expected, the MID results are the same for this constrained set of dyads as we originally report. The results are insignificant for Joint Energy and Upstream Energy variables in the set of dyads that do not have hydroelectric dams in the upstream state, but the No Energy dyads have a higher risk for MIDs than the omitted Downstream Energy dyads. Given that our sample is dominated by situations where upstream states have some ability to control water flow, we use the larger dataset but control for dams in some of the reported models in the paper.
IV. Controlling for Landlocked States
Our results are robust with a land-locked variable (Table A9) , which we include to capture the fact that such states may be more dependent on rivers for navigation.
V. Controlling for Institutional Riparian Cooperation and Shared IGOs
In Table A11 , we add four institutional measures to our baseline MID model capturing the presence of one or more TFDD treaties (in general), treaties with provisions for water quality, treaties with provisions for navigational issues, and a general shared IGO membership count from the Correlates of War IGO dataset. The TFDD variables do not reduce MID onset; shared IGOs reduce the chances for militarized conflict, similar to some studies in the democratic peace literature. Our primary results are robust to the inclusion of these controls; militarized conflicts are less likely in Downstream Energy dyads than Joint Energy and Upstream Energy dyads. 
